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“BITCH,” GO DIRECTLY TO JAIL:  
STUDENT SPEECH AND ENTRY INTO THE  
SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 
Catherine J. Ross∗ 
School disciplinary codes often trample upon speech that is constitutionally 
protected, even under the special jurisprudence that governs student speech in 
school. These infringements of First Amendment rights go beyond silencing and 
censoring speech—they lead to long-term suspensions, expulsion, referrals to 
alternative schools, and even to the juvenile justice system. And yet the link 
between the exercise of First Amendment rights and wrongful school exclusion 
has received virtually no attention.1 
That omission obscures an important link between the infringement of 
student speech rights and the juvenile justice system: violations of school rules 
that restrict constitutionally protected expression are a leading cause of the 
initial discipline that sets children on the path from school to a delinquency label 
and confinement. This Article examines the nexus that connects constitutionally 
protected expression, violations of school speech codes, and school exclusion.  
Reported cases and news coverage of incidents that never reached a 
courtroom reveal that the common penalty for speech teachers and 
administrators find offensive is exclusion from class, out-of-school suspension 
(sometimes for a few days, and sometimes for weeks or months), assignment to 
an alternative school for troubled youth, or expulsion. Sometimes the same 
speech event—usually a violation of the school code prohibiting speech that is 
constitutionally protected outside of school—leads both to exclusionary 
discipline and referral to the police or to juvenile court. 
Because few scholars steeped in juvenile justice also write on freedom of 
expression, and those who write on the First Amendment rarely focus on 
juvenile justice, we lack a robust understanding of how punishment for school 
speech leads to the exclusionary penalties known to push children off track. 
Where the facts in any given speech case include suspension, as is common, the 
well-documented impact of an initial suspension helps us to fill in the blanks 
 
∗  Catherine J. Ross is Professor of Law at the George Washington University Law School and, 
during 2015–2016, a Visiting Scholar at the Harvard University Graduate School of Education. The 
author thanks Dean Blake Morant and George Washington University Law School for research 
support, Mary Kate Hunter for reference assistance, and Marie Hayrapetian for excellent research 
assistance.  
1.  A rare exception is RUSSELL J. SKIBA, IND. EDUC. POLICY CTR., ZERO TOLERANCE, ZERO 
EVIDENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINARY PRACTICE 9 (2000), http://www.unl.edu/srs/ 
pdfs/ztze.pdf (“These cases [four 1999 exclusion incidents] seem to have at their heart a conflict 
between two fundamental rights: the right of free speech, and the right of schools to protect students 
and staff from real or perceived harm.”).  
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even though we do not have long-term follow up on the individual student. We 
know an initial suspension is likely to lead to more suspensions, school absences, 
and other negative outcomes that increase a young person’s chances of 
incarceration. And in some court cases in which students successfully challenge 
penalties their school imposed on speech that is constitutionally protected, the 
student has already been referred for prosecution or confinement based on the 
exercise of speech rights at school. 
Most of the seminal decisions on student speech rights, along with many less 
heralded cases, were brought by students who were suspended, expelled, or sent 
to alternative schools. They include the iconic Barnette sisters, who refused to 
say the Pledge of Allegiance in the early 1940s and were barred from school with 
the threat of being sent to a juvenile detention facility looming over them;2 visual 
artist Sarah Boman, who faced a four-month suspension and compulsory 
psychological evaluation for hanging a poster of a fictional narrative, “Who 
killed my dog?”, until a federal judge issued an injunction;3 and, most recently, 
Taylor Bell, who was suspended and sent to an alternative school for six weeks in 
response to a rap recording he made off campus and placed on Facebook and 
YouTube, which school officials claimed threatened two coaches whom Bell’s 
lyrics accused of sexually harassing female athletes.4 
Section I sets the stage by summarizing the pertinent research on the long-
term consequences of disciplinary exclusion and the reasons for the dramatic rise 
in school exclusion, including zero tolerance and police presence on campus. 
Section II introduces the special legal doctrine that protects student speech rights 
on campus and the tests used to assess whether schools have violated students’ 
First Amendment rights. Section III shows that school exclusion has long been at 
the heart of litigation over student speech rights, even though it has never been 
the focus of the legal arguments or the judicial opinions. Sections IV and V turn 
to the close connection between cursing on campus—which is constitutionally 
protected if it is not lewd—and arrest and delinquency adjudication. Section VI 
explains the distinction between insubordinate speech, which may have 
constitutional protection, and insubordinate conduct, which does not. Finally, 
Section VII analyzes the intersection of racial disparities, speech, school 
discipline, arrest, and incarceration revealed in litigation challenging the 
treatment of students in Meridian, Mississippi. 
I. SCHOOL EXCLUSION AND THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 
Exclusionary discipline in the form of out-of-school suspension or expulsion 
is commonly understood to be a “drastic” remedy, one with enormous downsides 
that can change the trajectory of a child’s life forever.5 A consensus is forming 
 
2.  W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
3.  Boman v. Bluestem Unified Sch. Dist. No. 205, No. 00-1034-WEB, 2000 WL 297167 (D. Kan. 
Jan. 28, 2000). 
4.  Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 
2015) (en banc), cert. denied, No. 15-666, 2016 WL 763687 (U.S. Feb. 29, 2016).  
5.  Jeffrey H. Lamont, Council on Sch. Health, Out-of-School Suspension and Expulsion, 131 
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that disciplinary exclusion is overused and disproportionate to many of the 
offenses that trigger suspension and expulsion as well as referral to the justice 
system. 
“[O]ut-of-school suspension,” Daniel Losen and Jonathan Gillespie report, 
“is no longer a measure of last resort in a large number of school districts . . . . 
Well over three million children, K-12, are estimated to have lost instructional 
‘seat time’ in 2009–2010 because they were suspended from school.”6 That is, 
they tell us, “about the number of children it would take to fill every seat in 
every major league baseball park and every NFL stadium in America, 
combined.”7 
The Children’s Defense Fund first demonstrated in 1975 that suspension 
and other exclusionary disciplinary measures diminish a student’s prospects for 
academic success and increase the risk of juvenile delinquency and 
incarceration.8 Reliance on school exclusion as a disciplinary policy has 
persisted—indeed, it has grown—even though repeated studies have shown that 
it starts students “[on a] trajectory from the classroom to the justice system,” 
known as the “school-to-prison pipeline.”9 A student who has been suspended 
once is more likely to be suspended again, to be left back, and to fail to graduate 
on time or at all.10 Suspension or expulsion nearly triples the likelihood that a 
student will have contact with the juvenile justice system during the next 
academic year.11 
These pathways do not prove that only “bad” children are suspended. On 
the contrary, the studies show that suspension itself derails children’s lives.12 The 
risks exist whether a student misses classes during in-school suspension, during 
an out-of-school suspension that lasts only a few days, or is excluded for weeks 
or months.13 Students who miss class find it “harder . . . to stay on track” 
 
PEDIATRICS e1000, e1002 (2013).  
6.  DANIEL J. LOSEN & JONATHAN GILLESPIE, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, OPPORTUNITIES 
SUSPENDED: THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF DISCIPLINARY EXCLUSION FROM SCHOOL 6 (2012), 
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/resources/projects/center-for-civil-rights-remedies/school-to-prison-
folder/federal-reports/upcoming-ccrr-research/losen-gillespie-opportunity-suspended-2012.pdf.  
7.  Id. at 6.  
8.  CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, SCHOOL SUSPENSIONS: ARE THEY HELPING CHILDREN? 61–62 
(1975), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED113797.pdf.  
9.  Rebecca W. Cohen, Reframing the Problem: New Institutionalism and Exclusionary 
Discipline in Schools, J. EDUC. CONTROVERSY, 2013, at 1. 
10.  See, e.g., Marian Wright Edelman, Opinion, Zero Tolerance Discipline Policies: A Failing 
Idea, SKANNER (June 10, 2013), http://www.theskanner.com/opinion/commentary/18780-zero-
tolerance-discipline-policies-a-failing-idea-2013-06-10 (arguing that Massachusetts’s expulsion and 
suspension policies need revision). See generally CATHERINE Y. KIM ET AL., THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON 
PIPELINE: STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM (2010).  
11.  EMILY MORGAN ET AL., COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., THE SCHOOL 
DISCIPLINE CONSENSUS REPORT: STRATEGIES FROM THE FIELD TO KEEP STUDENTS ENGAGED IN 
SCHOOL AND OUT OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 11 (2014) [hereinafter SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 
CONSENSUS REPORT], https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/The_School_Discipline 
_Consensus_Report.pdf.  
12.  KIM ET AL., supra note 10, at 78; Cohen, supra note 9, at 1.  
13.  See SCHOOL DISCIPLINE CONSENSUS REPORT, supra note 11, at 9 (discussing the importance 
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academically, which may lead to truancy and to additional suspensions.14 This is 
why researchers often refer to suspension as deprivation of instructional time.15 
Missing classroom time because of disciplinary exclusion “appears to have 
negative effects on student outcomes” for individual students, measured by the 
likelihood of additional suspensions, delayed promotion and graduation rates, as 
well as for the learning environment of schools that rely heavily on exclusionary 
discipline.16 Exclusions from class reinforce the notion that school is not a 
positive, supportive environment, resulting in alienation and increased voluntary 
absences following suspension.17 
Because missing school and marginal literacy are highly correlated with 
subsequent incarceration, loss of instructional time can be devastating even at a 
young age.18 According to child development expert James Comer, by around 
the third grade children begin to classify themselves as being in the mainstream 
or being marginalized at school. Most of those who conclude they are 
marginalized, he says, will never achieve their potential.19 
Reliance on school exclusion began to surge after passage of the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act in 1994. That federal statute mandated a zero-tolerance policy 
(removing educators’ discretion to consider context or mitigation) for students 
who brought weapons to school.20 The American Academy of Pediatrics 
reported that school systems “quickly seized on zero-tolerance policies” to 
respond to “nonviolent offenses, such as drug and alcohol violations, verbal 
disrespect to teachers, and truancy.”21 Two decades later, less than two percent 
of the students excluded from school were charged with possessing weapons.22 It 
is estimated that no more than five percent of out-of-school suspensions are 
attributable to “serious or dangerous” offenses, such as assaults or possessing 
weapons or drugs.23  
 
of remaining in the classroom).  
14.  Id.  
15.  See, e.g., DANIEL J. LOSEN & RUSSELL J. SKIBA, SUSPENDED EDUCATION: URBAN MIDDLE 
SCHOOLS IN CRISIS 8 (2010), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/ 
publication/Suspended_Education.pdf.  
16.  Id. at 10 (citation omitted); see also Lamont, supra note 5, at e1001 (finding students who 
“experience out-of-school suspension and expulsion” are ten times more likely to drop out of school).  
17.  See SCHOOL DISCIPLINE CONSENSUS REPORT, supra note 11, at 9–11. 
18.  CHILDREN’S DEF. FUND, AMERICA’S CRADLE TO PRISON PIPELINE 136 (2007), 
http://www.childrensdefense.org/library/data/cradle-prison-pipeline-report-2007-full-lowres.pdf.  
19.  Id.  
20.  20 U.S.C. § 7151 (2012); JACOB KANG-BROWN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, ISSUE 
BRIEF: A GENERATION LATER: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED ABOUT ZERO TOLERANCE IN SCHOOLS 1 
(2013), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/zero-tolerance-in-schools-policy-br 
ief.pdf (explaining that zero tolerance policies which removed administrative discretion in fashioning 
appropriate responses to certain offenses began in the 1980s in response to drug offenses); Lamont, 
supra note 5, at e1001. 
21.  Lamont, supra note 5, at e1001. 
22.  Id. (citing data showing that less than two percent of suspensions and expulsions involve 
weapons).  
23.  JENNI OWEN ET AL., INSTEAD OF SUSPENSION: ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE 
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A comprehensive 2014 report on school discipline issued by the Council of 
State Governments summarized the problem: “[M]illions of students are being 
removed from their classrooms each year, mostly in middle and high schools, and 
overwhelmingly for minor misconduct. When suspended, these students are at a 
significantly higher risk of falling behind academically, dropping out of school, 
and coming into contact with the juvenile justice system.”24 
Similarly, a 2014 U.S. Department of Education report on national school 
discipline trends lamented, “[u]nfortunately, a significant number of students are 
removed from class each year—even for minor infractions of school rules,”25 
including rules governing speech. All the studies concur: most exclusionary 
discipline is imposed for what the Council of State Governments termed “minor 
misconduct.”26 
It is less clear what comprises “minor misconduct” because in most 
jurisdictions schools are not required to disaggregate data on school discipline. 
As one study explained, “[T]he overwhelming majority of disciplinary violations 
reported . . . appear as generic violations of the code of conduct, making it 
impossible to determine more precisely the behavior for which the student was 
disciplined.”27 Reports lump together fistfights, conduct that materially disrupts 
a classroom, and violations of the school’s speech code including cursing.28 
Although most states do not release information about the number of 
suspensions or the reasons for them,29 data have emerged in the last few years 
from selected cities and states that confirm the national picture. Generic code 
violations by definition do not include violent conduct, acts, or language that 
violates the criminal code, or even conduct that amounts to a status offense for 
which a minor could be adjudicated a delinquent, such as consuming alcohol or 
being “incorrigible.” 
Ten percent of the nation’s public school students are in Texas, where a 
comprehensive longitudinal study published in 2011 revealed that sixty percent 
of all students “were suspended or expelled at least once between their seventh- 
 
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 44 (2015), https://law.duke.edu/childedlaw/schooldiscipline/downloads/instead 
_of_suspension.pdf.  
24.  SCHOOL DISCIPLINE CONSENSUS REPORT, supra note 11, at ix; see TONY FABELO ET AL., 
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES: A STATEWIDE STUDY OF 
HOW SCHOOL DISCIPLINE RELATES TO STUDENTS’ SUCCESS AND JUVENILE JUSTICE INVOLVEMENT 
(2011), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Breaking_Schools_Rules_Report_Fin 
al.pdf (longitudinal study of Texas students).  
25.  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDING PRINCIPLES: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR IMPROVING SCHOOL 
CLIMATE AND DISCIPLINE i (2014) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDING PRINCIPLES], 
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/school-discipline/guiding-principles.pdf.  
26.  SCHOOL DISCIPLINE CONSENSUS REPORT, supra note 11, at ix. 
27.  FABELO ET AL., supra note 24, at 18; see also Edelman, supra note 10 (discussing a study of 
discipline in Massachusetts which found that in 2009–2010 over half of the more than 60,000 reported 
suspensions and expulsions were for “unassigned offenses”—nonviolent infractions of the school code, 
including “swearing [and] talking back to a teacher”).  
28.  See, e.g., FABELO ET AL., supra note 24, at 18.  
29.  LOSEN & GILLESPIE, supra note 6, at 37–38.  
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and twelfth- grade school years.”30 Only three percent of suspensions were 
attributable to violent or serious offenses, a figure that tracks national averages. 
The children who were disciplined for “minor misbehavior” violated school 
codes but did not threaten material disorder or violence, and did not break any 
laws.31 
Responding to these findings in 2012, Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson of 
the Supreme Court of Texas condemned the “criminalization of children for 
nonviolent offenses that result in a trip not to the principal’s office but to a 
courtroom.”32 The “single greatest predictor [of involvement in the juvenile 
justice system],” he warned, “is a history of disciplinary referrals at school.”33 
In New York City, too, statistics show that in 2011–2012, the “overwhelming 
majority of suspensions . . . were for minor . . . offenses, such as 
insubordination,” which generally refers to verbal challenges or “talking back.”34 
Minor offenses, including infractions of school speech codes, often lead to 
short suspensions, which require only “rudimentary precautions.”35 In Goss v. 
Lopez, the Supreme Court held that suspensions for no more than ten days 
require minimal procedural protections.36 Suspensions of more than ten days 
require more robust procedural protections, including a hearing.37 The 
distinction makes short suspensions efficient for school districts. Some states also 
relieve schools of the obligation to report statistics on suspensions that do not 
last more than ten days. This distinction likely results in underreporting of the 
total number of students suspended each year.38 
Some students experience repeated short suspensions.39 A student 
suspended for less than ten days lacks entitlement to educational services in 
many jurisdictions, and in that sense may be worse off than a student who 
receives a longer suspension. Because the student is not entitled to educational 
services, he or she is likely to lack adult supervision while suspended unless the 
 
30.  FABELO ET AL., supra note 24, at ix.  
31.  Id. at 16–18; N.Y.C. SCHOOL-JUSTICE P’SHIP TASK FORCE, KEEPING KIDS IN SCHOOL AND 
OUT OF COURT: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2, 4, 10 (2013), https://www.nycourts.gov/ip/justice 
forchildren/PDF/NYC-School-JusticeTaskForceReportAndRecommendations.pdf; see Layshock ex 
rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that suspension for off-
campus expressive conduct was a violation of student’s First Amendment rights because actions did 
not substantially disrupt school); see also SKIBA, supra note 1, at 3.  
32.  Wallace B. Jefferson, Recognizing and Combatting the ‘School-to-Prison’ Pipeline in Texas, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. COURTS (2012), http://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/future-trends-
2012/home/Other-pages/SchoolToPrison-Pipeline-In-Texas.aspx. 
33.  Id. (citing TEXAS APPLESEED, TEXAS’ SCHOOL TO PRISON PIPELINE 2 (2007)).  
34.  N.Y.C. SCHOOL-JUSTICE P’SHIP TASK FORCE, supra note 31, at 2. 
35.  Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975).  
36.  Id. at 579–80. 
37.  Id. at 581.  
38.  See Edelman, supra note 10 (reporting that because Massachusetts schools do not have to 
report suspensions of less than ten days the “actual number of disciplinary exclusions is likely at least 
two or three times the 60,000 reported”). 
39.  LOSEN & GILLESPIE, supra note 6, at 12, 14 (explaining that “many students are suspended 
two, three, or even more times in a school year but counted only once”).  
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student has a parent who is not employed. The lack of educational services and 
adult supervision further exacerbates the negative impact of even a brief 
exclusion. 
The risks are not randomly distributed. The risk of being suspended or 
expelled varies by state and even by school district, depending on the culture of 
the school and its approach to discipline.40 Moreover, research has amply 
documented that dramatic disparities persist in the rate of school exclusion based 
on race and disability, and, to a lesser extent, gender.41 
Those disparities are inextricably entwined with in-school arrests, which 
lead in a direct shortcut from school to court and prison for offenses that do not 
violate either the criminal code or the special status offense rules that can land a 
juvenile (but not an adult) in jail.42 The enormous leeway schools have to punish 
students for violating internal disciplinary codes regularly blends into the state’s 
power to charge minors as delinquents. The seriousness of the potential penalty 
raises the constitutional stakes. 
The proliferation of armed police officers at schools has only intensified the 
risks of entering the fast track from school to court. These officers frequently 
advise principals about the law and immediately arrest offenders who might have 
 
40.  Id. at 20; YOUTH UNITED FOR CHANGE & ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, ZERO TOLERANCE IN 
PHILADELPHIA: DENYING EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES AND CREATING A PATHWAY TO PRISON 6 
(2011), http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/68a6ec942d603a5d27_rim6ynnir.pdf (finding that Philadelphia’s 
in-school “arrest rate was between three and 25 times higher than most of the other districts” in 
Pennsylvania, and within the city, “one single high school . . . had more arrests in 2008–09 than 17 of 
the other 19 largest school districts in the state” (emphasis omitted)); Lamont, supra note 5, at e1001.  
41.  E.g., KRISTEN LEWIS & SARAH BURD-SHARPS, MEASURE OF AM., ZEROING IN ON PLACE 
AND RACE: YOUTH DISCONNECTION IN AMERICA’S CITIES 7, 9–10 (2015), http://ssrc-
static.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/MOA-Zeroing-In-on-Place-and-Race-Final.pdf 
(providing data collected since 2012 showing that “disconnection,” a term describing young people 
who are neither in school nor employed, is highly correlated to the failure to complete high school and 
that rates of disconnection show that Latino girls and women are twenty percent more likely to be 
disconnected than their male counterparts, and that Asian American girls are also more likely than 
Asian American boys to be disconnected); EDWARD J. SMITH & SHAUN R. HARPER, UNIV. OF PA. 
CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE & EQUITY IN EDUC., DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT OF K-12 SCHOOL 
SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION ON BLACK STUDENTS IN SOUTHERN STATES 1 (2015), 
https://www.gse.upenn.edu/equity/sites/gse.upenn.edu.equity/files/publications/Smith_Harper_Report.
pdf (finding that, while African American males are disproportionately suspended more than other 
groups, “when compared to girls from other racial/ethnic groups, Black girls were severely and most 
disproportionately” subjected to discipline).  
42.  U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Guiding Principles, supra note 25, at i–ii; Jason P. Nance, Students, 
Security, and Race, 63 EMORY L.J. 1, 27 (2013); Losen & Gillespie, supra note 6, at 28–29 (postulating 
that this focus may result in part from the availability of data, as well as the importance of the issue). 
In a recent report, the U.S. Department of Education stated that it does not collect data on why 
students were subjected to exclusionary discipline. SIMONE ROBERS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2014, at 82 (2015), 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2015/2015072.pdf. For reasons that are unclear, the Department defines a 
“serious disciplinary action” differently than the Court did in Goss v. Lopez, as “suspensions lasting 5 
days or more, removals with no services for the remainder of the school year (i.e. expulsion), and 
transfers to specialized schools.” Id. See infra Section V for a discussion of arrests and delinquency 
adjudications based on protected expression. 
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never come to the attention of law enforcement for minor infractions in the past. 
The number of school resource officers increased thirty-eight percent between 
1997 and 2007, with some schools having a heavy police presence that helps to 
push children out of school.43 Police officers posted in schools may or may not be 
school resource officers. Some school districts, including New York City, 
Philadelphia, and Los Angeles, maintain their own independent police forces.44 
It may not make much difference whether the uniformed officers on the school 
campus are school employees or members of the city’s police force, because 
school resource officers may or may not receive training, and even if trained may 
not be better equipped to interact with teenagers than members of the regular 
police force.45 
II. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS FOR STUDENT SPEECH 
Many of the “minor infractions” that result in school exclusion involve 
speech code violations. The codes, in turn, often penalize expression that the 
First Amendment protects outside of school and, to a lesser but still substantial 
extent, on the school campus. In school or out, the government may regulate 
certain kinds of speech deemed as having very low value: the narrow legal 
category of “true threats,” incitement, libel and slander, and material that fits the 
legal definition of obscenity, as well as speech used to commit crimes like 
fraud.46 However, a social assessment of words as having low value, or being 
uncivil, does not remove the speech from the umbrella of First Amendment 
protection. 
The expressive rights of students are governed by a special First 
Amendment jurisprudence. It protects some rude speech in school—including 
much cursing and verbal disrespect toward teachers—so long as the expression is 
not accompanied by disruptive conduct. 
A string of Supreme Court cases, from West Virginia v. Barnette, decided in 
1943, through Morse v. Frederick in 2007, established the scope of students’ 
speech rights in school. In Barnette, the Court upheld the right of students who 
were Jehovah’s Witnesses to refuse to say the Pledge of Allegiance because it 
violated their beliefs.47 Instead of seeking a religious exemption, they asserted a 
right to resist a compulsion to speak words that the state imposed. Barnette 
stands, among other things, for the principles that civil liberties are as important 
in schools as they are elsewhere, and that even the youngest public school 
students have constitutional rights. 
 
43.  AMANDA PETTERUTI, JUSTICE POLICY INST., EDUCATION UNDER ARREST: THE CASE 
AGAINST POLICE IN SCHOOLS 1 (2011), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/ 
educationunderarrest_fullreport.pdf.  
44.  Id. at 3. 
45.  Id.; CARLA SHEDD, UNEQUAL CITY: RACE, SCHOOLS, AND PERCEPTIONS OF INJUSTICE 93–
99 (2015).  
46.  United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 
(2003).  
47.  W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
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The Court subsequently established a special regime for evaluating whether 
school censorship violates the Speech Clause. The earliest case to carve out a 
special constitutional doctrine for student speech, Tinker v. Des Moines, decided 
in 1969, explained that in schools the conflict between individual rights and 
authority required some modification of normal First Amendment standards in 
light of the role schools play in society and in preparing youth for citizenship.48 It 
set forth a new standard for student speech: student expression on campus is 
constitutionally protected unless the school can show a reasonable apprehension 
that the speech will lead to material disruption or collide with the rights of 
others.49 The Court held that schools in Des Moines had violated the rights of 
young people by preventing them from wearing black armbands to protest the 
war in Vietnam because the expression did not pose a risk of material disruption. 
As the Court became more conservative, subsequent decisions under each 
new Chief Justice cut back on Tinker’s protection for student speech. The Court 
gradually set up a taxonomy of rights and tests for whether school had violated 
students’ expressive rights. The present regime may be understood as limiting 
application of the Tinker test to students’ personal expression on campus, the 
type of speech that is involved in most of the cases discussed in this Article. The 
remaining categories of speech enjoy less protection. 
Under Bethel v. Fraser (1986) a school has discretion to prohibit “lewd, 
indecent, or offensive language” in order to promote “the shared values of a 
civilized social order.”50 Fraser aims at the manner in which students express 
themselves rather than at the content or viewpoint of their speech. This lewd or 
vulgar manner of expression is the “profanity” barred by school codes that is 
often linked to “defiance” and “disrespect.” All three manners of expression 
appear to account for a large number of school suspensions, as highlighted in 
Section I. 
Fraser gives schools almost unlimited discretion to punish the lewd and 
crude, though lower courts have struggled to define the manner of speech Fraser 
governs.51 Educators commonly push the margins of the speech Fraser allows 
them to censor—impolite speech with sexual overtones—and claim that they 
have authority to regulate all manner of cursing (especially when directed at 
authority figures) without impinging on the constricted universe of school speech 
rights. In many schools cursing is a zero-tolerance offense. That is bad enough 
from a First Amendment perspective, but the stakes are much higher when 
violation of a school’s rule against cursing leads to a juvenile court referral.52 
 
48.  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969). 
49.  Id. at 513.  
50.  Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).  
51.  CATHERINE J. ROSS, LESSONS IN CENSORSHIP: HOW SCHOOLS AND COURTS SUBVERT 
STUDENTS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 66, 71–73 (2015).  
52.  Moreover, the school loses control over the nature of the penalty once it refers a student to 
law enforcement, so the penalty may be even harsher than school officials intended. They will not 
always know whether the student will be adjudicated in juvenile court or transferred to the adult 
system. See, e.g., N.C. v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.3d 852, 865 (Ky. 2013) (Abramson, J., concurring) 
(maintaining that students are entitled to Miranda warnings when interrogated about school-based 
  
726 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
 
No bright line divides speech governed by Fraser’s grant of almost unlimited 
authority to educators and school boards from words that lie outside their 
discretion to control. The Supreme Court has never elucidated exactly what 
manner of speech Fraser governs. As I have explained elsewhere, some efforts to 
invoke Fraser’s extreme deference to educators clearly go too far: reliance on 
vague definitions to try to bring any form of insubordinate speech within the 
boundaries of Fraser’s lewd or vulgar expression, including references to “hell” 
in poetry, and even using a finger and thumb to mimic a gun.53 And the case fails 
to provide any test that would limit a school’s discretion. As Chief Justice 
Roberts cryptically observed, “The mode of analysis employed in Fraser is not 
entirely clear.”54 
The rules governing speech that appears to be the school’s own also give 
schools enormous discretion. Under Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988) a school 
may regulate school-sponsored speech (speech that takes place in any activity 
related to the curriculum and that appears to bear the school’s imprimatur) on 
the basis of any legitimate pedagogical concern.55 While Hazelwood significantly 
undermines free expression in schools—giving officials power to control most 
school publications and many other kinds of speech on campus—it generally 
leads to prior restraint of speech, not to the discipline that is the focus of this 
Article. 
Finally, under Morse, schools may bar and punish all speech that appears to 
advocate the use of illegal substances unless the speech is political.56 Very few 
controversies of the sort Morse governs have been reported, and speech 
advocating drug use (as opposed to possession or sale of illegal substances) does 
not appear to lead to a large number of suspensions.57 
III. EXCLUSIONARY DISCIPLINE IN SCHOOL SPEECH LITIGATION 
The risk of being suspended for expression the Constitution protects in 
school has always been at the heart of litigation over student speech rights. 
Families sue schools seeking injunctive relief so their children can return to 
school or seeking to expunge a disciplinary record that resulted from an 
unconstitutional infringement of expression. But because courts have taken a 
hands-off approach to assessing whether the penalty is proportionate to the 
offense, the legal questions before the courts are largely limited to whether the 
student had a First Amendment right to engage in the expression for which the 
 
offenses by or in front of law enforcement officers because it will not be clear whether a referral will 
proceed in juvenile or criminal court, and because a minor adjudicated in juvenile court may age out 
and complete a sentence in an adult jail).  
53.  ROSS, supra note 51, at 86–91, 156 (discussing breast cancer awareness bracelets); id. at 179 
(discussing racially insensitive speech).  
54.  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404 (2007).  
55.  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).  
56.  Morse, 551 U.S. at 408–09.  
57.  Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v. Frederick, 2007 SUP. CT. 
REV. 205, 222–23. Of course, conduct involving illegal substances on and off campus does lead to 
suspensions and expulsions, but such conduct is outside the scope of my discussion here.  
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school imposed a penalty, and whether the school satisfied the legal standard for 
inhibiting the type of speech at issue without violating the Constitution. 
The link between protected speech and school exclusion is at the heart of 
four of the five iconic student speech cases, all the way back to the first one in 
1943.58 The Barnette sisters had been suspended from school and were not 
allowed to return until they agreed to say the Pledge of Allegiance. Long before 
anyone coined the phrase “school-to-prison pipeline,” the Barnette Court was 
deeply aware of the risks that accompanied school exclusion. Under state law, 
the Court noted, the girls risked being charged with “insubordination” and 
expelled from school.59 
The peril was real. Around the country, thousands of Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
like the Barnettes, had in fact been expelled from school because their faith 
prevented them from saying the Pledge. The American Bar Association put the 
issue to the Court in the starkest terms in its amicus brief, in language that could 
have been written today about the risks of school exclusion. Some of the children 
expelled from school for refusing to say the Pledge, the ABA stated, “get 
piecemeal instructions from their parents; . . . others are torn from their homes 
and committed for the rest of their adolescence to institutions for juvenile 
delinquents” either for insubordination or because they were not attending 
school—expulsion being no defense to truancy.60 
Suspensions were also at issue in the remaining Supreme Court cases 
involving students’ personal expression. Three of the Tinker siblings and their 
co-dissident Christopher Eckhardt were sent home and told they could not 
return to school until they stopped wearing black armbands.61 Matthew Fraser, 
whose nominating speech for a buddy in a high school election was a string of 
double entendres (without profanity), was suspended for three days and his 
name was removed from the ballot for commencement speaker (he won by 
write-in ballot and received an injunction ordering the school to let him deliver 
the address).62 Finally, Joseph Frederick was initially suspended for ten days for 
refusing the principal’s order to put down his “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” banner at the 
Olympic torch parade the entire school was attending.63 
In each of those cases, the students’ speech was constitutionally protected 
when they spoke. The Supreme Court held that the Barnettes and the students in 
Tinker had been wrongfully punished because the Constitution protected their 
expression. And although the Court upheld the disciplinary actions against both 
Fraser and Frederick, the law protected their speech at the time they engaged in 
it. In order to rule for the school officials in Fraser and Morse, the Court had to 
 
58.  In the fifth case, Hazelwood, the school engaged in prior restraint by cutting articles from 
the school newspaper before it was published. 484 U.S. at 264.  
59.  W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943).  
60.  Brief of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, of the American Bar Association, as Friends of 
the Court at 24, W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (No. 591).  
61.  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). 
62.  Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 667–78 (1986). 
63.  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397–98 (2007).  
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abandon existing doctrine to reach the result it wanted—upholding the authority 
of educators to inhibit students’ manner of speech or ideas that undermined a 
school’s anti-drug message.64 
The facts in many lower court cases show the same pattern of exclusion 
from education in response to constitutionally protected expression the school 
considers offensive or objectionable: an art poster, immediately removed, asking 
“Who killed my dog?”, which resulted in suspension for the rest of the school 
year—81.5 days;65 suspension or the risk of suspension for wearing t-shirts 
promoting or denouncing rights for LGBT persons, or taking a stand for or 
against abortion rights;66 refusing to remove a shirt with a political message;67 or 
calling a classmate a “poo-poo head” on the playground.68 All of these incidents 
involved personal student expression that is protected under Tinker. 
None of this expression involved any realistic threat to the safety of the 
school or its occupants, and none posed a credible risk of material disruption. 
Schools have wide discretion to segregate students who appear to have issued 
threats even when the language does not rise to the level of a true threat.69 
Where there is no real threat of either violence or material disorder (which 
would satisfy the Tinker standard), schools must reintegrate the speaker and 
should rescind any penalty on the student’s record. But school authorities 
commonly dig in their heels and refuse to back off even after it is clear that the 
student never constituted a threat to safety or to the educational process.70 
Schools respond disproportionately to speech for which adults could never 
be punished, and for which young people could not be punished outside of 
school, with potentially life-changing consequences. Even if a student pursues a 
civil lawsuit and ultimately prevails, unless the student obtains an injunction, the 
penalty will be applied before the lawsuit is resolved. 
 
64.  See ROSS, supra note 51, at 39–41 (discussing Fraser).  
65.  Boman v. Bluestem Unified Sch. Dist. No. 205, No. 00-1034-WEB, 2000 WL 297167, at *1 
(D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2000) (court enjoined the suspension). 
66.  E.g., Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. # 204, 523 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 2008); 
Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2001); Gillman ex rel. Gillman v. Sch. Bd. 
for Holmes Cty., Fla., 567 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1362–64 (N.D. Fla. 2008); Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. 
of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 967 (S.D. Ohio 2005).  
67.  Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 322–23 (2d Cir. 2006) (describing that the 
student was sent home and discipline was noted on his permanent record).  
68.  Deborah Wrigley, Parents Blame Book for Son’s Suspension, ABC13 (May 19, 2011, 4:36 
PM), http://abc13.com/archive/8140843/.  
69.  Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1070 n.7 (9th Cir. 2013); Wisniewski v. Bd. 
of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that Tinker provides 
“significantly broader authority” than the true threats doctrine “to discipline a student’s expression 
reasonably understood as urging violent conduct”).  
70.  See, e.g., Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist, 432 F. Supp. 2d 682, 685–86 (W.D. Tex. 2006) 
(discussing a situation where a principal undermined his argument that a student posed a threat based 
on his fictional writings when he allowed the student to return to class before turning him over to the 
police, sending him to an alternative school, and labeling him a “terroristic threat”), vacated, 508 F.3d 
765, 771 (5th Cir. 2007) (sustaining the school’s actions in light of Columbine and other school 
shootings); Boman, 2000 WL 297167, at *2 (discussing a situation where the school board refused to 
reinstate a student even though the review officer found that her poster was not threatening).  
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So, for example, before the Fifth Circuit ruled that Adam Porter’s two-year-
old drawing of a violent attack on his school was protected speech, Adam had 
been arrested and kept in jail for four days, threatened with expulsion, sent to an 
alternative school, and dropped out of high school.71 The court mentioned 
Adam’s learning disabilities in passing because the complaint rested in part on 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, but did not ask what role, if any, 
Adam’s disabilities played in the discipline he received.72 The court held that the 
school had violated Adam’s speech rights by punishing him, but no one could 
turn back the clock and restore his route to a high school diploma.  
IV.  CURSING, ZERO TOLERANCE, AND JUVENILE COURT ADJUDICATIONS 
Violating a student speech code, by itself, shouldn’t turn a young person 
into a dropout or a delinquent. But it does, and repeatedly.73 
The manner of speech most likely to get kids into trouble does not involve 
any form of true threat or any real threat of substantial disruption, just threats to 
hierarchy and civility. As Sections I and II show, many incidents that lead to 
school exclusion involve cursing or disrespectful speech, especially—though not 
always—addressed to an authority figure such as a teacher or administrator. In 
New York City, for example, the use of “profane language” is one of the top ten 
reasons that schools suspend students.74 Indeed, fully eighty-one percent of 
suspensions were based on infractions of the school speech code such as “using 
profane language or lying.”75 
Rude or crude speech is unlikely to garner much sympathy from many 
adults. Students have called teachers a “dick,” “skank,” and “tramp,” all of 
which fall within Fraser’s domain because they have sexual overtones.76 While 
 
71.  Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 612, 619–21 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding the 
speech constitutionally protected, but granting qualified immunity to the school official because 
“subtle” questions and the “unsettled nature of First Amendment law” governing several aspects of 
the case could have led “reasonable school officials” to make “reasonable mistakes”).  
72.  Id. at 612 (noting the complaint included allegations under IDEA).  
73.  Because neither the states nor the federal government collect information in a way that 
disaggregates the offenses that lead to exclusionary discipline, it is not possible to estimate with 
precision the number of suspensions that are based on students’ rude manner of speech. Consequently, 
the data do not permit us to determine what proportion of those suspensions is based solely on 
language that lies within schools’ power to punish under the broad discretion provided under Fraser, 
or what percentage is based solely on language the Constitution protects from penalty even in school.   
74.  SAMANTHA POWNALL, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A, B, C, D, STPP: HOW SCHOOL 
DISCIPLINE FEEDS THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 12 (Johanna Miller et al. eds., 2013), 
http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/nyclu_STPP_1021_FINAL.pdf; 8th Grader Arrested for 
Throwing Skittles on School Bus, WGNTV.COM (May 13, 2015, 8:10 AM), http://wgntv.com/ 
2015/05/13/school-district-busts-students-for-candy-cellphones-profanity/ (noting that the Jefferson 
Parish, Louisiana school district arrested roughly 1,600 students for offenses like “swearing and 
carrying cell phones” in just one school year).  
75.  N.Y.C. SCHOOL-JUSTICE P’SHIP TASK FORCE, supra note 31, at 4. 
76. See ROSS, supra note 51, at 72–73, 80–84 (discussing Smith ex rel. Smith v. Mount Pleasant 
Pub. Schs., 285 F. Supp. 2d 987, 989 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (student called principal a “skank” and a 
“tramp”); and Posthumus v. Bd. of Educ. of Mona Shores Pub. Schs., 380 F. Supp. 2d 891, 894–95 
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on the Third Circuit, Justice Alito offered this clarification: Fraser permits 
schools to “prohibit words that ‘offend for the same reason that obscenity 
offends,’” but does not allow regulation of other manners of expression that may 
be “plainly offensive.”77 Schools, however, assert authority to control and punish 
words and attitudes far beyond Fraser’s reach—words that have no sexual 
connotations, but are merely deemed by adults to be in “bad taste.”78 
Adults have a constitutional right to curse, even using words that have a 
sexual meaning, as the seminal case of Cohen v. California held.79 But it has long 
been accepted that students have no right to wear Cohen’s infamous jacket, 
which gained its rhetorical power from its “crude” exclamation: “Fuck the 
Draft.”80 
In some states, however, such as Texas or Mississippi, cursing can lead to an 
arrest in school and adjudication as a delinquent even though a minor could not 
be arrested for cursing outside of school. Until 2013, Texas had a “ticketing” 
system that allowed school-based police officers to issue citations to students for 
misdemeanors, including truancy, chewing gum, disrupting class, “disorderly 
language,” and talking back to teachers. The ticketed students had to appear in 
court, were subject to fines, and often did not know that they were entitled to 
attorneys. When students turned seventeen, any unpaid fines could lead to 
incarceration.81 
In one apparently typical instance, a high school senior in Texas received a 
ticket with a $340 fine from a police officer posted in the school after she cursed 
at another student. When she failed to show up for a court hearing because she 
could not pay, the judge raised the fine to $637. Although she took a waitressing 
job to raise the money, she had saved only $100 when the court issued a warrant 
for her arrest.82 
V.  ARRESTS AND DELINQUENCY ADJUDICATIONS BASED ON PROTECTED 
EXPRESSION 
In 1969 the Tinker court certainly did not envision that protesters would be 
arrested rather than sent home if they refused to remove their black armbands. 
But that is exactly what happens in contemporary America, on the ground that 
students refused to follow orders even when the order aims to silence political 
speech that the First Amendment clearly protects. In one 2013 incident, a West 
 
(W.D. Mich. 2005) (student called assistant principal a “dick”)).  
77.  Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 213 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J.) (quoting 
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)).  
78.  E.g., Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding penalty for making fun 
of the vice principal in a campaign speech).  
79.  Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).  
80.  Id. at 16, 21; Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., 
concurring).  
81.  Jody Serrano, School Officers Can No Longer Issue On-Campus Citations, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 
29, 2013), http://www.texastribune.org/2013/08/29/class-disruption-cases-head-principals-office-not-/.  
82.  Jessica Hopper, Texas High School Senior Fined $637 for Cursing at School, ABCNEWS (Feb. 
2, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/texas-teen-fined-cursing-fellow-student/story?id=12821959.  
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Virginia eighth grader was both suspended and arrested when he refused to 
remove his shirt, which displayed the NRA logo, a rifle, and the phrase “Protect 
your right.” The police removed him from the school.83 The episode gained 
prominence when students all over the state showed up wearing NRA apparel to 
show their support for the boy’s right to express his political views.84 
Very few state appellate courts have squarely considered whether 
delinquency adjudication (largely governed by state law) based solely on a 
school speech code infraction is constitutional. Most of the cases involve 
rudeness to authority figures, often using profanity. The courts are divided. 
Some of the states that have ruled on the question have concluded that 
prosecution for offensive speech in school does not violate the Constitution if the 
criminal statute tracks the Supreme Court’s language about the standards that 
apply to student speech. The highest court in South Carolina, for example, 
upheld a statute that allowed the state to prosecute students for speech that was 
“disruptive” or “interfere[d]” with the educational process, which it deemed to 
provide fair notice that Tinker would not protect the speech.85 
The opinion ignored the fact that the mode of analyzing whether the state 
wrongfully constricted speech set forth in Tinker applies only in the “special 
environment” of the public school.86 In essence, the delinquency offense under 
the South Carolina code amounts to nothing more than breaking a school rule, a 
situation the studies discussed earlier in this Article indicate holds true in many 
parts of the country. The criticisms justly leveled at excluding a child from school 
for breaking a school rule apply tenfold to adjudicating a child a delinquent for 
the same behavior. 
Other state courts have attempted to bring the school speech that led to a 
delinquency adjudication outside the protections of the Speech Clause, 
commonly by asking whether the words amounted to “fighting words” that 
would not be protected anywhere.87 These courts have ruled that state penal 
statutes that reach knowing abuse of teachers on school grounds or while they 
are engaged in performance of their duties, including “insulting” a teacher, will 
be sustained as applied only if, in context, the insult amounts to “fighting words.”  
Fighting words, categorically removed from the scope of the First 
Amendment by Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire in 1942, are words “which by 
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the 
peace.”88 As subsequently defined, fighting words must be directed to a 
 
83.  Victoria Taylor, West Virginia Teen Suspended, Arrested After Wearing NRA Shirt Returns 
to School in the Same Shirt, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 23, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/ 
news/national/teen-suspended-arrested-nra-t-shirt-returns-school-shirt-article-1.1325252. 
84.  Id.  
85.  In re Amir X.S., 639 S.E.2d 144, 147–50 (S.C. 2006).  
86.  See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“First 
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are 
available to teachers and students.”). 
87.  E.g., In re Nickolas S., 245 P.3d 446, 447 (Ariz. 2011); In re Louise C., 3 P.3d 1004, 1006 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); In re L.E.N., 682 S.E.2d 156, 158 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).  
88.  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
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particular person, and must be “inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction” 
from the person at whom the insult is directed.89 
Courts applying this analysis to student speech are likely to conclude that 
teachers, as a group, are not going to respond to insults from students by 
engaging in a fistfight. Therefore state courts have ruled that a student’s 
muttered “bitch,”90 “I’d better get my ‘fucking’ [confiscated marker] back after 
school,”91 and “fuck this, I don’t have to take this shit,” addressed to a teacher 
do not constitute fighting words and fall within the speech the First Amendment 
protects.92  
Even repeated insults (in class and in the suspension room), including 
“fucking bitch,” “stupid bitch,” and more, shouted within ten feet of the teacher, 
are protected by the First Amendment against prosecution by the state.93 
Discussing these facts, an appellate court in Arizona instructed that school 
discipline is called for, but went on to say that penalties imposed by the school 
are the only permissible responses when students insult teachers: 
 We do not believe that the natural reaction of the average teacher to 
a student’s profane and insulting outburst, unaccompanied by any 
threats, would be to beat the student. . . . [Such] conduct, although 
reprehensible, is properly punished through school discipline . . . rather 
than by characterizing it as fighting words likely to provoke a violent 
reaction by his teacher.94  
Where the insult does not amount to fighting words, because a teacher is 
unlikely to take the bait, the First Amendment prohibits delinquency charges or 
criminal prosecution. Courts taking this approach regularly underscore that the 
rude student remains vulnerable to school discipline—including suspensions.95 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas took a starker position when it held that a 
student could never be adjudicated a delinquent just for lobbing a curse word at 
a teacher. An eighth-grade girl had been suspended and adjudicated a 
delinquent for referring to her science teacher as a “bitch” during class. The 
court reversed and overturned the state statute which made it a misdemeanor to 
“abuse or insult a public school teacher while that teacher is performing” his or 
her job. The court held that the law violated the First Amendment by 
criminalizing speech that did not amount to fighting words and therefore fell 
within the First Amendment’s protection.96 
 
89.  Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 
(1989) (characterizing fighting words as an “invitation to exchange fisticuffs”).  
 90.  Shoemaker v. State, 38 S.W.3d 350, 355–56 (Ark. 2001).  
 91.  L.E.N., 682 S.E.2d at 157. 
 92.  Louise C., 3 P.3d at 1004. 
93.  In re Nickolas S., 245 P.3d 446, 447 (Ariz. 2011). 
94.  Id. at 452–53 (reversing delinquency adjudication and noting that Nickolas was not charged 
under other statutes targeting assault, intimidation, or disruption of education).  
95.  Id. at 453 (reversing delinquency adjudications below); L.E.N., 682 S.E.2d at 157 (same); 
Louise C., 3 P.3d at 1007 (same).  
96.  Shoemaker v. State, 38 S.W.3d 350, 355–56 (Ark. 2001) (discussing cases from other states 
and overturning the statute as overbroad and vague).  
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Adjudication as a delinquent (the equivalent of prosecution and conviction) 
based on a school infraction, the Arkansas court made clear, pushes far beyond 
the considerable discretion educators have to impose penalties for rude speech. 
Like several other state courts that had reached similar conclusions, it agreed 
that the term “bitch,” addressed to a teacher, was “derogatory and insulting” and 
“should be the subject of discipline and control by the school administration.”97 
The Arkansas statute, however, elided what should be a clear divide between 
school speech code violations subject to educational discipline and conduct 
subject to prosecution. That elision resembles the watering down of Fourth 
Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure in the special 
environment of the school, which permits campus searches that would be 
unconstitutional outside of school to yield evidence introduced against juveniles 
in drug cases.98 
Even if it were constitutional to criminalize calling an authority figure a 
“bitch,” which the highest court in Arkansas correctly held it is not, sound social 
policy should discourage schools and juvenile prosecutors from turning a student 
into a juvenile offender based on a moment of thoughtless or even intended 
offensive expression. A delicate balance exists in school between the need to 
educate students, which requires a certain level of order and decorum, and the 
natural inclination of adolescents to resist authority and test limits. Beyond that, 
in a democracy, individuals have a right to criticize those in authority, including 
teachers, even if doing so appears impolite or insensitive, as long as the student 
or citizen does not refuse to follow lawful directives—in the case of students, 
sitting and listening in class, taking exams, and so forth. 
VI. SPEECH ENTWINED WITH CONDUCT 
Readers may justifiably wonder whether it makes any sense to allow 
insubordinate speech addressed to teachers. Isn’t that part of what is wrong with 
kids today? Doesn’t disrespect stand in the way of a secure school environment 
and improved learning? 
The Speech Clause does not protect insubordinate conduct, it protects only 
words. When speech merges with conduct, the analysis becomes more complex. 
It is often a challenge to separate insubordinate conduct from the words that are 
part of the behavior. Dissenting from Justice Harlan’s masterful explanation in 
Cohen of why the First Amendment protects even the most offensive speech, 
Justice Blackmun regarded the slogan “Fuck the Draft” as a form of acting out, 
not a protected utterance.99 Small wonder that students and school officials may 
be confused about how far student speech rights extend, particularly when the 
student is behaving disrespectfully to school authorities. 
Judges instruct that “under contemporary constitutional concepts” the 
 
97.  Id. at 356. 
98.  See, e.g., FLA. STATE CONFERENCE NAACP ET AL., ARRESTING DEVELOPMENT: 
ADDRESSING THE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE CRISIS IN FLORIDA 31, 39, 43 (2006), http://b.3cdn.net/ 
advancement/e36d17097615e7c612_bbm6vub0w.pdf (describing arrests of students at school). 
99.  Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
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question of whether “admittedly ‘discourteous’ and ‘rude’ remarks” have 
constitutional protection in school is “a serious one.”100 The question of where 
the boundary falls is part of the larger puzzle of how to distinguish between what 
Justice Stevens called the enforceable “permissible rule” impinging on speech 
and an impermissible rule whose enforcement always violates the Speech 
Clause.101 Even permissible rules may be administered in a way that infringes 
constitutional rights—for example, when enforced only against disfavored 
viewpoints. 
Assigning the label “insubordinate” to speech often reflects subjective 
judgments. As the New York Civil Liberties Union observes, “While some 
misbehavior is clear by any objective standard—smoking at school, for 
example—other behaviors are more subjectively assessed. Studies repeatedly 
confirm that subjective infractions, like talking back or disrespect for authority, 
may be interpreted differently depending on the teacher’s and student’s race.”102 
They may also be influenced by the teacher’s perceptions of the student as 
fundamentally “good” and on track, or problematic. 
The boundaries between conduct, verbal insubordination, and protected 
speech can be difficult to discern, especially in the heat of the moment. Common 
sense sometimes seems to evaporate. 
Crystal Kicklighter, a white eleventh grader in Georgia, pregnant by her 
black boyfriend, responded to her classmate’s “sit [your] pregnant ass down,” 
with a retort the school thought even ruder: “You just mad because you ain’t got 
nobody pregnant.”103 The principal suspended Kicklighter for five days and told 
her she could not return until she apologized to the class. Two weeks later, when 
she returned to school but refused to apologize, she was arrested and removed 
from the building. Kicklighter spent the rest of the academic year on suspension. 
She formally withdrew from school the next year.104 
Kicklighter sued, alleging among other things that the school district had 
violated her speech rights by conditioning her return to school on compelled 
expression (an apology) in violation of Barnette’s holding that the First 
Amendment bars compelled speech. It is inconceivable, Justice Jackson wrote in 
Barnette, that “a Bill of Rights which guards the individual’s right to speak his 
own mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in 
his mind.”105 
The court upheld the original suspension as well as the conditions attached 
to Kicklighter’s return to school, even though those conditions cut Kicklighter’s 
education short. Perhaps Kicklighter’s initial conduct—standing as class 
started—would have been a sounder basis for school discipline, but even that 
conduct would not have justified the severity of the penalty that resulted from 
 
100.  Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 758 (6th Cir. 1989).  
101.  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 434–35 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
102.  POWNALL, supra note 74, at 13.  
103.  Kicklighter v. Evans Cty. Sch. Dist., 968 F. Supp. 712, 714 n.2 (S.D. Ga. 1997). 
104.  Id. at 715. 
105.  W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943).  
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mutual intransigence as events unfolded.  
While the Constitution does not require it, a sounder social policy would 
have led the school to help Kicklighter find a face-saving way to continue her 
education instead of pushing her out. Why not reduce the penalty to “time 
served”? 
VII. THE INTERSECTION OF RACE, SPEECH, DISCIPLINE, ARREST, AND 
INCARCERATION IN MERIDIAN, MISSISSIPPI 
In 2014, the U.S. Department of Education corroborated a string of studies 
that reported shocking disparities in the use of exclusionary discipline based on 
race and disability: “Nationwide . . . youths of color and youths with disabilities” 
are far more likely than other students to be expelled or suspended.106 Members 
of both groups are also much more likely than other young people to be 
“referred to law enforcement” by school authorities.107 Study after study 
underscores that children of color and children with disabilities are greatly 
overrepresented among students who are suspended, expelled, sent to 
alternative schools, and referred to the juvenile justice system.108 
Events in Meridian, Mississippi illustrate this conjunction of racial 
discrimination, speech offenses, school exclusion, and in-school arrests. These 
conditions led the U.S. Department of Justice to charge that the Meridian School 
District was one of the worst school-to-prison pipelines in the country.109 
Meridian had been the subject of a school desegregation lawsuit that began 
in 1965, in which the United States had intervened on behalf of the plaintiffs. 
That litigation did not end until 2013, when the district court entered a consent 
decree. 
The consent decree in the desegregation case specifically addressed 
disparities in disciplinary policies and referrals to law enforcement as they 
affected children of color and those with disabilities. Among other things, the 
decree barred the school from referring students to law enforcement except 
where state law required schools to do so, or when “necessary to protect the 
physical safety of students or school personnel.”110 It further required the school 
district to treat “public order offenses,” including “profanity [and] dress code 
violations” as matters for school discipline, “rather than criminal law issues 
warranting [school resource officer] involvement,” language suggesting that the 
school system had been inappropriately referring students to law enforcement 
 
106.  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 25, at i.  
107.  LOSEN & GILLESPIE, supra note 6, at 6–7; U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDING PRINCIPLES, 
supra note 25, at i; Nance, supra note 42, at 41.  
108.  E.g., SMITH & HARPER, supra note 41, at 1.  
109.  Elisabeth Kauffman, The Worst “School-to-Prison” Pipeline: Was it in Mississippi?, TIME 
(Dec. 11, 2012), http://nation.time.com/2012/12/11/the-worst-school-to-prison-pipeline-was-it-in-mississ 
ippi/.  
110.  Consent Order ¶ 83, No. 4:65-CV-1300 HTW-LRA, 2012 WL 1067105 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 28, 
2012). 
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for exactly these kinds of speech code violations.111 
In 2012, as the school desegregation case was winding down, the U.S. 
Department of Justice filed another lawsuit against Meridian and the State of 
Mississippi following an investigation into the juvenile justice system in 
Lauderdale County where Meridian is located. The complaint alleged, among 
other things, that schools regularly asked the police to arrest students for 
“conduct that would traditionally be considered to constitute only a school 
disciplinary infraction, including disrespect, refusal to follow the directions of a 
teacher, and profanity.”112 It further alleged that police officers always arrested 
students when the school asked them to, making the arrests in school, and often 
handcuffing minors while escorting them from the building.113 
In addition, students placed on probation by the juvenile court frequently 
had their probation revoked for minor violations of the school code that 
resembled those leading to the initial arrest, including “dress code violations, 
profanity, ‘talking back’ or disrespect to teachers.”114 Revocation of probation 
resulted in confinement. A study by several public interest groups including the 
ACLU and the Advancement Project revealed that students who had been 
placed on probation by a juvenile court (often for low-level school code 
violations) were “routinely suspend[ed]” afterwards for “such low-level 
behaviors as use of vulgar language, flatulence in class, and dress code infractions 
like having a shirt untucked,” leading to “automatic incarceration” for violating 
the terms of their probation.115 
The parties agreed to wide-ranging procedural reforms in a consent decree 
entered in 2015.116 Focused on substantive and procedural issues under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, neither the complaint nor the consent decree expressly 
addressed violations of students’ speech rights that are implicated when young 
people are not only disciplined in school for cursing and other expression, but 
are also arrested and incarcerated for words that have constitutional protection. 
But the Meridian litigation and the evidence it generated help us to flesh out the 
 
111.  Id. ¶ 89.  
112.  Complaint ¶ 48, United States v. City of Meridian, No. 4:12CV168HTW-LRA, (S.D. Miss. 
Oct. 24, 2012), 2012 WL 5240820. 
113.  Id. ¶ 62–68. 
114.  Id. ¶ 53; see also Memorandum from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Phil 
Bryant, Governor of Miss., et al. 3 (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/ 
2642012810121733674791.pdf (noting that the Meridian police department “automatically arrests” all 
students referred by the school system, the juvenile justice system denies the children due process 
rights, and children on probation must serve any subsequent school suspensions in “the juvenile 
detention center”).  
115.  ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., HANDCUFFS ON SUCCESS: THE EXTREME SCHOOL 
DISCIPLINE CRISIS IN MISSISSIPPI SCHOOLS 3 (2013) (emphasis added), http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/ 
bd691fe41faa4ff809_u9m6bfb3v.pdf.  
116.  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Reaches Settlement Agreements to 
Address Unconstitutional Youth Arrest and Probation Practices in Meridian, Mississippi (June 19, 
2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-settlement-agreements-address-uncon 
stitutional-youth-arrest-and (discussing that the agreement reached between the Justice Department 
and the city of Meridian, which builds on the decree in Barnhardt v. Meridian). 
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pervasive injustice that can accompany unchecked disregard for speech rights 
that leads to in-school arrests and juvenile court referrals. 
The cases discussed above all involved expression at school. The most 
recent and dramatic expansion of schools’ proclaimed authority, discipline 
imposed for off-campus speech, involves even more dramatic overreach—tied 
once again to the risk of being adjudicated a delinquent and confined in a 
detention facility. 
VIII. EXCLUSIONARY DISCIPLINE AND JUVENILE COURT REFERRALS FOR  
OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH 
Over the last decade, schools have increasingly asserted jurisdiction to 
punish students for what they say in their free time, from their homes, and 
especially for what they say online.117 Schools have referred students for 
prosecution based on communications from off-campus that did not violate any 
civil or criminal laws. 
Remarkably, while this trend is seen nationwide, I can illustrate the point 
entirely with cases from the Third Circuit, the locus of Juvenile Law Center, 
which this Symposium honors on its fortieth anniversary, and of Temple 
University. 
In one instance, a school turned in a group of girls who were threatened 
with prosecution for transmitting “provocative”—though not indecent—pictures 
of themselves from an off-campus gathering until the ACLU intervened and 
courts ordered the overly eager prosecutor to cease and desist.118 
Three other cases involved virtually identical fact patterns: adolescent 
humor in the form of fictitious, satirical postings that disrespected faculty 
members, and turned out not to be so funny after all. Each involved a posting on 
MySpace that purported to be the page of a school administrator. All showed 
their target in a bad light, but none amounted to libel because they were so over 
the top as not to be credible. The targets of the “jokes” were variously depicted 
as swastika-wearing Satan lovers, “big,” focusing on physical bulk, and as a 
bisexual “sex addict and pedophile.” Some of the postings were prominently 
labeled as works of humor. The first, In re J.V.R., litigated by Marsha Levick of 
Juvenile Law Center, did not gain national prominence as a speech rights case, 
or even as a school-to-prison case, but rather because efforts to gain the release 
 
117.  The emerging doctrine governing off-campus speech is beyond the scope of this Article, 
but is discussed in Lessons in Censorship. ROSS, supra note 51, ch. 7. Since the book went to press, the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued an en banc decision, on which a petition for certiorari was 
denied. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 
2015) (en banc) (ruling for the school that sent Taylor Bell to an alternative school for six weeks in 
response to an online rap recording it regarded as containing a true threat), cert. denied, No. 15-666, 
2016 WL 763687 (U.S. Feb. 29, 2016). 
118.  Miller ex rel. Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 647 (M.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d sub nom. 
Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010); ROSS, supra note 51, at 239–40 (discussing incident 
involving thirteen-year-olds in Tunkhannock, Pennsylvania, where the school turned over the girls’ 
phones to the county district attorney even though the girls had not violated any law or even any 
school rule).  
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of the fictional page’s creator, who was confined to a for-profit facility, revealed 
a massive criminal kickback scheme involving two judges.119 
The two remaining cases—J.S. ex rel Snyder v. Blue Mountain School 
District and Layshock v. Hermitage School District—reached the Third Circuit 
en banc in 2011. The question before the court in each case squarely focused on 
whether public schools could discipline students for what they said off-campus 
when school was not in session. Neither the arguments nor the opinions went 
beyond noting that school authorities had referred both students to the juvenile 
justice system in addition to imposing exclusionary discipline on them at school. 
J.S., a middle school honors student, had a virtually unblemished record 
except for two dress code violations when she posted the crude fictional page 
that portrayed her assistant principal, James McGonigle, in what the court 
characterized as “vulgar” and “disturbing,” but not illegal, terms.120 McGonigle, 
who was the school disciplinarian, imposed a ten-day out-of-school suspension 
on J.S., and “threatened legal action” against J.S. and her parents. 
He went further. McGonigle “contacted the local police and asked about 
the possibility of pressing criminal charges.”121 They referred him to the state 
police, who told him he could press charges for harassment, but the charges were 
likely to be dropped. The state police summoned J.S., a girl who had 
collaborated with her on the site, and their parents to the police station for an 
interview, but McGongile ultimately did not pursue any charges. McGonigle 
wanted to have it both ways: to punish off-campus speech at school and to treat 
it as an offense in the world at large amenable to civil and criminal remedies. 
The appeals court held that the school violated J.S.’s First Amendment rights by 
punishing her for off-campus speech that had not posed any risk of disrupting the 
campus.122 
In the third case, also before the Third Circuit en banc, high school senior 
Justin Layshock was sent to an alternative facility for disturbed, disruptive 
students from January until the end of the academic year.123 He was also barred 
from extracurricular activities and his high school graduation ceremony. The 
district court denied injunctive relief, in part on the basis that Justin would not 
experience “irreparable harm.”124 In a familiar pattern, the en banc court 
 
119.  Order In Re: Expungement of Juvenile Records and Vacatur of Luzerne County Juvenile 
Court Consent Decrees or Adjudications from 2003–2008, No. 81 MM 2008 (Pa. Oct. 29, 2009) (per 
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jvr; Kids for Cash (SenArt Films 2013).  
120.  J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920–21 (3d Cir. 2011). 
121.  Id. 
122.  Id. at 931.  
123.  Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 412 F. Supp. 2d 502, 505 (W.D. Pa. 
2006) (noting Layshock first completed a ten-day suspension), aff’d in part on rehearing en banc, 650 
F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011).  
124.  Id. at 509 (denying a temporary restraining order); see also Layshock, 650 F.3d at 210 
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vindicated Justin’s First Amendment rights, but that victory did not come until 
five years after he completed high school at the alternative school to which he 
had been wrongfully relegated.125  
Some educators claim even more discretion to punish off-campus speech 
than they are allowed to exert at school. They seek unlimited discretion to upend 
students’ lives by punishing them for off-campus expression that, in the words of 
the Blue Mountain School District: “takes place anywhere, at any time, as long 
as it is about the school or a school official, . . . and is deemed ‘offensive.’”126 The 
en banc court scoffed, “Under this standard, two students can be punished for 
using a vulgar remark to speak about their teacher at a private party, if another 
student overhears the remark, reports it . . . and the school authorities find [it] 
offensive.”127 
Another federal judge, overturning the suspension of a girl who commented 
on her website that “Ms. Phelps” was the “worst teacher I’ve ever met,” took the 
analysis one step further.128 He called the idea that “students everywhere would 
be prohibited from the slightest criticism of their teachers, whether inside or 
outside of the classroom,” an authoritarian and constitutionally repugnant 
prospect.129 This brings us full circle to the life risks that accompany calling a 
teacher a “bitch” when that leads to school exclusion and adjudication as a 
delinquent. 
CONCLUSION 
The potential repercussions of violating school rules have not changed 
much since the Barnette sisters risked being sent to a reformatory for refusing to 
say the Pledge of Allegiance. The issue is not whether schools can teach or even 
compel a modicum of civility on campus, but whether a lack of civility should 
lead to disproportionate penalties that can set a child on the path from school to 
prison. Just as we should distinguish between the punishment Justin Layshock’s 
parents imposed at home and the penalties his school levied, it is critical to 
separate positive efforts by educators to encourage polite discourse from 
exercising the state’s coercive powers to punish children. No constitutional 
doctrine bars schools from teaching civility, empathy, and norms of civilized 
behavior, and many resources are available to help educators master alternative 
strategies premised on respect for students.130 
Events of the last few years offer encouragement that the worst abuses of 
discipline and arrest for student expression may be mitigated in the future. 
Efforts to reduce the number of school suspensions for minor offenses are 
beginning in states with as different politics as California and Texas. 
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129.  Id. at 1373.  
130.  See, e.g., OWEN ET AL., supra note 23, at 6–49.  
  
740 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
 
In California, where “willful defiance” accounts for nearly half of the state’s 
700,000 yearly suspensions and one-third of its expulsions, Los Angeles in 2013 
became the first California school district to bar suspension of students for 
willful defiance.131 
At around the same time, in 2013, the Texas legislature responded to 
widespread criticism of the “ticketing” system described in Section IV. Under 
the revised state code the police can no longer issue citations in school except for 
traffic violations and truancy.132 
The reforms are no panacea, however, as Texas Appleseed, a public interest 
organization, warns students: schools “can still send you to adult criminal court 
for minor misbehavior, like disorderly conduct,” including “cursing, making 
offensive gestures, [and] being too loud.”133 It just takes more effort. The school 
has “to file a criminal complaint now” rather than asking in-school police to issue 
a ticket on campus.134 
At the federal level, the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) has voiced 
concerns about overreliance on suspensions as a means of discipline for minor 
code-based offenses. In 2013, the DOE advised that law enforcement should 
never be asked to handle “non-violent conduct, such as . . . use of profanity, 
dress code violations [including controversial slogans on t-shirts], and disruptive 
or disrespectful behaviors.”135 Responding to a growing body of research on 
school exclusion, in 2014 the DOE expressly urged schools to reserve 
exclusionary discipline for the “most serious infractions” and as a “last resort,” a 
view echoed at the White House Conference on school discipline the next 
year.136 It remains to be seen whether such reforms will take root, and whether 
they will be honored at the level of school districts and individual schools.  
Educators need to understand the legal doctrines that protect student 
expression. If that happens, we may at long last witness greater respect for 
expressive rights. Such renewed respect should result in a bright line between in-
school discipline for violations of constitutionally permissible school speech 
codes and exclusionary discipline or arrest and referral to juvenile court in 
response to constitutionally protected expression a school rule prohibits. It 
violates the First Amendment to label a teenager a delinquent because he or she 
called a teacher a bitch. And while depriving that student of educational 
opportunity may or may not be unconstitutional depending on the facts, it surely 
is unwise and counterproductive as a matter of social policy. 
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